![]() “However, the United States has demonstrated its commitment to carry out unilateral operations should it perceive a direct non-state actor threat against the United States,” he added. “Any action in support of the Afghan military forces would likely require a specific request from the Afghan government, and likely need to match the overflight or operational agreements with neighboring countries.” active military intervention, even through the use of armed drones,” Baker said. “Without operational basing in Pakistan, the bar will likely be higher for U.S. decision-making on post-withdrawal airstrikes in Afghanistan. operational sites in the region and overflight permission from regional countries will have a significant impact on U.S. drone flights over Afghanistan, south of the mountain range, but potential operations from Central Asia may offer similar intelligence and surveillance support,” Baker said. “Pakistan would have served as a much better base of operations for U.S. use of its territory as a base of operations could degrade Washington’s ability to carry out intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions over Afghanistan. ![]() military carrying out operations from Central Asia, provided there are clear constraints on its mission. Russia, Baker said, reportedly supports the U.S. to base aircraft on its soil for operations over Afghanistan, Washington has entered discussions with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. military and intelligence community to truly prioritize threats.Since neighboring Pakistan isn’t allowing the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan is that it has forced the U.S. One under-appreciated benefit of the U.S. This should not be conflated with the unhinged permissiveness of past drone wars which saw thousands of civilians killed based on dubious intelligence or none at all. This weekend’s strike on Ayman al-Zawahiri represents over-the-horizon at its best: eliminating a high value target based on actionable intelligence, likely with pre-approval by the Commander-in-Chief, and potentially with regional support. troops in-country, albeit at a significantly higher cost. Furthermore, many of the deficiencies of an over-the-horizon strategy were still a reality even with tens of thousands of U.S. approach to counterterrorism in Afghanistan over the last twenty years. But it is a more sustainable form of risk management that necessarily diverts from the futile task of risk elimination that dominated the U.S. An over-the-horizon posture is complicated by less human intelligence, extended flight distances for drones and manned aircraft, and numerous other logistical and intelligence limitations. Much of the criticism is valid from a technical standpoint. ![]() It was largely received with sneers and criticism. The Biden administration first pitched “over-the-horizon” strike capabilities as a way that the United States could manage counterterrorism after the withdrawal by conducting air and drone strikes from bases outside Afghanistan. Arguing otherwise became a lonely position in Washington. The prevailing critique of an over-the-horizon strategy was that it would be nearly impossible to conduct effective counterterrorism strikes without continuing a 20-year failed counterinsurgency. It cannot be exaggerated how improbable conventional critics of President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan insisted today’s success would be. But it is also important to recognize just how wrong the conventional groupthink was about the limits of post-withdrawal counterterrorism. Tonight’s announcement that al-Qaeda terrorist Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed over the weekend is the product of years of effort and Americans who paid the ultimate sacrifice.
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